Peirce claims in his Lectures on Pragmatism [CP 5.196] that “If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction;” and further “no effect of pragmatism which is consequent upon its effect on abduction can go to show that pragmatism is anything more than a doctrine concerning the logic of abduction.” Plausibly, there is, at best, a quasi-logic of abduction, which properly issues in our best means (...) for the methodological evaluation and ordering of (yet untested) hypotheses or theories. There is always a range of explanatory innovations that may be proposed, from more conservative to less conservative; and it is important, in light of what Peirce has to say on the relation of abduction to pragmatism, that in ruling out “wild guessing,” attention be initially directed to more conservative proposals. Still conservatism, which we might understand in terms of Peircean continuity, is sometimes justly sacrificed for greater comprehension or overall simplicity of approach. This paper explores the relationships among Peircean abduction and pragmatism, the “theoretical virtues” approach to the evaluation of hypotheses, and contextual constraint on the scientific imagination. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the preliminary evaluation of expressions of moral sentiment under conditions of cultural pluralism. The advance of science and technology puts ever new power over nature in human hands, and if this new power is to more fully serve human ends, then it must become the means or material of human virtue. This prospect poses the question of the relationship between power and virtue, and equally, the question of how scientific advances may be understood to enter into (...) a pluralism of moral doctrines and deliberations. Taking a page from the philosophy of science, the present approach examines the relationship between scientific advances and moral evaluations of developing practices as mediated by contemporary accounts of the virtues of hypotheses. If we conceive of expressions of moral sentiment as hypotheses for the amendment or expansion of existing moral doctrines in the light of new possibilities for action, then this suggests that expressions of moral sentiment may be evaluated, in a preliminary way, by reference to standard lists of the virtues of hypotheses: refutability, conservatism, modesty or simplicity, precision, elegance, and generality. Expressions of moral sentiment are subject to preliminary evaluation, on cognitive grounds, by reference to their prospective integration and/or modification of on-going moral traditions. (shrink)

In his 2018 book, Identity, the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Stanford University politi­cal scientist Francis Fukuyama addresses themes which might more properly be considered matters of political philosophy and the philosophy of law: How are we to navigate between traditional, ethnic, unitary conceptions of the nation on the one hand, and the threat of identitarian fragmentation on the other? Though Fukuyama affirms the importance of the concepts of human dignity and identity, more or less as these (...) are commonly understood, he also criticizes the contemporary phenomenon of identity politics—which he views as a danger to liberal democ­racy. “The rise of identity politics in modern liberal democracies,” writes Fukuyama, “is one of the chief threats that they face;” and moreover, “unless we can work our way back to more universal understand­ings of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict.” This paper raises the question of whether the well reasoned case against identity politics as a threat to national unity and purpose leaves room for skepticism of fast-paced and more ambitious (“Wilsonian”) pursuit of internationalist goals of globalization. Greater emphasis on political consensus at home may helpfully strengthen the hand of American foreign policy in support of liberal democracy. But we now look back with well founded skepticism on neo-conservative interventionism, and there are just and needed limits on globalizing internationalism imposed by and implicit in the retreat from identity politics. Having lost the unity of purpose of Cold War liberalism, we are yet to find a “golden mean” avoiding ethnic nationalism and short of political fragmentation. (shrink)

Der berühmte Censor M. Porcius Cato gilt als Römer von altem Schrot und Korn. Dabei war er offen für die modernen literarischen Möglichkeiten seiner Gegenwart und wurde zum Schöpfer der lateinischen Schriftprosa. "Vom Landbau" beschreibt die damals modernsten landwirtschaftlichen Techniken, enthält aber auch Rezepte, Zaubersprüche, medizinische Hinweise und juristische Formeln.

Der im Frühjahr 44 v. Chr. entstandene Dialog "Über die Wahrsagung" versteht sich zunächst als Ergänzung zur Schrift "Vom Wesen der Götter". Er geht der Frage nach, ob die Götter sich der Menschen in der Weise annehmen, dass sie ihnen einen Weg zur Vorhersage der Zukunft eröffnen. Gegen diese stoische Position, wie sie im 1. Buch von Ciceros Bruder Quintus entwickelt wird, zieht der Autor im 2. Buch selbst zu Felde, höchst geistreich und im Wesentlichen dem neuakademischen Skeptiker Karneades folgend. (...) Obwohl der Text mit einem Bekenntnis zur vorsichtigen Zurückhaltung im Urteilen ausklingt, hat ihn die Nachwelt überwiegend im "aufklärerischen" Sinne verstanden: Besonders das 18. Jahrhundert beschäftigte sich intensiv damit und fand in Cicero einen frühen Kronzeugen für die eigene Auffassung, dass alle Formen der Zukunftserhellung auf reinem "Aberglauben" beruhten. Tatsächlich stellen sich die Verhältnisse insofern verwickelter dar, als "Wahrsagung" aus dem antiken öffentlichen und privaten Leben überhaupt nicht wegzudenken ist; auch Cicero will dies nicht, und seine eigene Haltung dem überwältigenden und befremdlichen Phänomen gegenüber ist eher durch Zweifel als durch einfache Ablehnung gekennzeichnet. Aus dem reichen Schrifttum der Antike, das dem Gegenstand gilt, ist allein Ciceros Werk erhalten geblieben. Sein religionsgeschichtlicher Wert ist unschätzbar, weit über die Alte Welt hinaus. Anschaulich und anhand vieler Beispiele führt es die verschiedenen Formen der Wahrsagung vor: griechische Orakel, ekstatisches Sehertum, Träume, Lose, Astrologie, römische Auspizien und etruskische Haruspizien. Mit Einführung, Anmerkungen und Literaturhinweisen. (shrink)

Die neue herausragende Übertragung. Cicero verfasste "De officiis" in den Monaten nach der Ermordung Caesars als Vermächtnis an seinen Sohn. Von allen Werken Ciceros hat es am stärksten auf die Nachwelt gewirkt. Es wurde am häufigsten übersetzt und kommentiert. Voltaire und Friedrich der Große hielten "De officiis" für das beste Buch zum Thema moralisches Verhalten.

SummaryThe ethical fundaments of research are objectivity and logic. The subjective and objective elements in the procedure: formulation of a problem — hypothesis — experimentation — selection of arguments — theory are discussed with examples from experimental biology, foremost plant physiology. A certain amount of subjectivity is essential in research, but violations of ethical rules beyond that are not uncommon. The importance of a paradigm is emphasized; research ethics may be low under pre‐paradigm conditions. The reasons for lacking ethics are (...) discussed, and the difficulty for publishing media to control research ethics is emphasized. (shrink)

This paper examines normative elements in Henri Lauener’s “open transcendentalism,” with an eye to evaluate distinctive theses. After setting out some of Lauener’s basic positions in this area, in comparison with related views in Quine’s work, I argue that the views surveyed converge on a normative and contextualist cognitivism in Lauener’s methodological and epistemological perspective. Though he resists similar conclusion in the name of anti-naturalism, I argue that his “open transcendentalism” is plausibly construed as a non reductive naturalism.

In this early paper I set out an argument in favor of the standard semantics of first-order logic, to the effect that (Vx)(Ey)x=y. Though my arguments from the paper have since been revised in details, The conclusion of the paper seems still viable and acceptable.

This article is an invited overview of contemporary issues connected with meaning and the analytic-synthetic distinction.

This paper argues for the importance of the concept of purported reference in understanding linguistic meaning and reference.

American philosopher William James (1842-1910) traveled to Oxford, England and Manchester College in 1908. Between 4 May and 28 May, he deliver the Hibbert Lectures, which were originally published in 1909 as A Pluralistic Universe. This was to be the last major book James published during his lifetime. Manchester College had been founded in the English city of Manchester in 1786 for the education of nonconformists, and moved to Oxford in 1888. Some considerable emphasis on religion in the Hibbert Lectures (...) is expected. They are an annual series of “non-sectarian lectures on theological issues” sponsored by the Hibbert Trust, which was founded in 1847 by the Unitarian Robert Hibbert to “uphold the unfettered exercise of private judgment in matters of religion.” Though Manchester College is located in Oxford, it was not until recently (1996) that it became one of the colleges of Oxford University. At the time of James’ visit, it was outside the university and part of Great Britain’s accommodation to Christian non-conformists. (shrink)

Von Theoderich zunächst gefördert, dann wegen Hochverrats zum Tode verurteilt, verfasste Boethius seine Schrift im Gefängnis vor seiner Hinrichtung. Sein Werk ist eines der wirkungsmächtigsten der Spätantike und zählt zu den beliebtesten Büchern des Abendlandes überhaupt. Zweifellos war der Autor Christ, doch suchte er Trost und Hoffnung nicht beim Christentum, sondern in der philosophischen Tradition.

Brian Wormald provides a fundamental reappraisal of one of the most complex and innovative figures of the late-Elizabethan and Jacobean age. In the centuries since his death, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) has been perceived and studied as a promoter and prophet of the philosophy of science--natural science--but he saw himself also as a clarifier and promoter of what he called "policy" or the study and improvement of the structure and function of civil states. Mr. Wormald shows that Bacon was concerned equally (...) with the knowledge of the world of nature and with that of policy. The junction between the two enterprises was effected by his work in history; and in the end it was Bacon's conception and practice of history that provided the answer to his efforts to advance policy and natural philosophy. (shrink)

Excerpt: IT will lead into my subject most conveniently to contrast and separate two divergent types of mind, types which are to be distinguished chiefly by their attitude toward time, and more particularly by the relative importance they attach and the relative amount of thought they give to the future. The first of these two types of mind, and it is, I think, the predominant type, the type of the majority of living people, is that which seems scarcely to think (...) of the future at all, which regards it as a sort of blank non-existence upon which the advancing present will presently write events. The second type, which is, I think, a more modern and much less abundant type of mind, thinks constantly and by preference of things to come, and of present things mainly in relation to the results that must arise from them. The former type of mind, when one gets it in its purity, is retrospective in habit, and it interprets the things of the present, and gives value to this and denies it to that, entirely with relation to the past. The latter type of mind is constructive in habit, it interprets the things of the present and gives value to this or that, entirely in relation to things designed or foreseen. While from that former point of view our life is simply to reap the consequences of the past, from this our life is to prepare the future. The former type one might speak of as the legal or submissive type of mind, because the business, the practice, and the training of a lawyer dispose him toward it; he of all men must constantly refer to the law made, the right established, the precedent set, and consistently ignore or condemn the thing that is only seeking to establish itself. The latter type of mind I might for contrast call the legislative, creative, organizing, or masterful type, because it is perpetually attacking and altering the established order of things, perpetually falling away from respect for what the past has given us. It sees the world as one great workshop, and the present is no more than material for the future, for the thing that is yet destined to be. It is in the active mood of thought, while the former is in the passive; it is the mind of youth, it is the mind more manifest among the western nations, while the former is the mind of age, the mind of the oriental. Things have been, says the legal mind, and so we are here. The creative mind says we are here because things have yet to be. Now I do not wish to suggest that the great mass of people belong to either of these two types. Indeed, I speak of them as two distinct and distinguishable types mainly for convenience and in order to accentuate their distinction. There are probably very few people who brood constantly upon the past without any thought of the future at all, and there are probably scarcely any who live and think consistently in relation to the future. The great mass of people occupy an intermediate position between these extremes, they pass daily and hourly from the passive mood to the active, they see this thing in relation to its associations and that thing in relation to its consequences, and they do not even suspect that they are using two distinct methods in their minds. As well known as HG Wells is for his science fiction, this is simply HG Wells discussing our view of the present and the future and various nuances related to both. Very interesting. (shrink)